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In June of 2014, the “Islamic State” (ISIL)1, a former al-Qaeda affiliate, seized
control of Mosul, a city in northern Iraq close to the border of both Syria and Turkey.2
Shortly after the seizure of Mosul, the group declared a worldwide caliphate and
demanded allegiance from other Islamist groups.3 Since this declaration, ISIL’s
territorial control has rapidly spread across northern Iraq and Syria.4 In addition to
expanding its geographical presence, ISIL has also taken responsibility for a number
of terrorist attacks throughout the world—perhaps most notably, the November 2015
Paris attacks.5
In response to the emergence of ISIL, the United States began using military force
in an attempt to stop the group’s growth. The United States has mostly used strategic
airstrikes to attack ISIL, but there has also been some use of special operations
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1. The Islamic State is referred to by a number of different names, the most common
being the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, and Daesh
()شعاد. Faisal Irshaid, Isis, Isil, IS or Daesh? One Group, Many Names, BBC (Dec. 2, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27994277 [https://perma.cc/M8SJ-YL8J]. For
the purpose of this Note I will refer to the group as ISIL.
2. Martin Chulov, Isis Insurgents Seize Control of Iraqi City of Mosul, GUARDIAN (June
10, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/10/iraq-sunni-insurgents-islamicmilitants-seize-control-mosul [https://perma.cc/8YE9-EPDC].
3. Matt Bradley, ISIS Declares New Islamic Caliphate, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/isis-declares-new-islamist-caliphate-1404065263
[https://perma.cc/2D5H-KZJG]; David Ignatius, How ISIS Spread in the Middle East,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/howisis-started-syria-iraq/412042/ [https://perma.cc/5MR2-W95Y].
4. Ben Piven, Who, What and Where Is ISIL? Explaining the Islamic State, ALJAZEERA
(Sept. 18, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/9/18/isil-threat-explained.html
[https://perma.cc/XL6F-TZAL].
5. Steve Almasy, Pierre Meilhan & Jim Bittermann, Paris Massacre: At Least 128 Killed
in Gunfire and Blasts, French Officials Say, CNN (Nov. 14, 2015), http://www.cnn.com
/2015/11/13/world/paris-shooting/ [https://perma.cc/22NC-3H8B].
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troops. Additionally, in some instances, the United States has supplied equipment
and training to local troops who oppose ISIL.6 Despite the United States’ continued
use of force against ISIL, Congress has not granted authorization specifically
permitting the executive branch to use military force in response to ISIL’s
emergence.
In recent military campaigns Congress has typically passed legislation that
authorizes the executive’s use of military force. For example, Congress passed an
authorization for the use of military force (AUMF) following the September 11th
attacks in 2001. During his presidency, President Obama requested that Congress
pass a new AUMF specifically granting the use of force against ISIL, but Congress
failed to enact any specified authorization.7 President Trump has not renewed
Obama’s attempt to receive new authorization from Congress, but members of his
cabinet have expressed their support for new legislation.8
Congress refused to pass Obama’s proposed resolution due to differences in
beliefs regarding the extent of authorization that should be granted.9 It is unlikely
that any compromise will be made due to the heavy division of opinion among
lawmakers, as even members of the same party have differing opinions about the
proper parameters for using force against ISIL.10 Despite the general disagreement
regarding the extent of power that should be allocated to the executive, the majority
of Congress does support the use of force against ISIL.11
In the absence of such an authorization, the Obama administration relied on the
AUMF that was passed in 2001 as a response to the September 11th terror attacks
(9/11 AUMF).12 This provision states:
[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order

6. Ashley Fantz, War on ISIS: Who’s Doing What?, CNN (Nov. 27, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/20/world/war-on-isis-whos-doing-what/
[https://perma.cc/HL6N-V8ZH]; Eric Messinger, Congress Appropriates Funds for President
to Train Syrian Opposition, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 19, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/
15221/congress-appropriates-funds-president-train-syrian-opposition/
[https://perma.cc/47FQ-M74L].
7. Jim Acosta & Jeremy Diamond, Obama ISIS Fight Request Sent to Congress, CNN
(Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/11/politics/isis-aumf-white-house-congress/
[https://perma.cc/6DV4-AAYA].
8. Jeremy Herb, Mattis, Tillerson Talk Authorizing ISIS War, CNN (Aug. 2, 2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/02/politics/mattis-tillerson-isis-war/index.html
[https://perma.cc/EU25-SN6V].
9. Acosta & Diamond, supra note 7.
10. Id.
11. Id.; Herb, supra note 8.
12. Marty Lederman, The Legal Theory Behind the President’s New Military Initiative
Against ISIL, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 10, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/14799/legaltheory-presidents-military-initiative-isil/ [https://perma.cc/D9PP-37QK].
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to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United
States by such nations, organizations or persons.13
The Obama administration asserted that the 9/11 AUMF has always allowed the
President to “address the threat from ISIL” and that President Obama only requested
a new AUMF because he “believe[s] we are strongest as a nation when the President
and Congress work together.”14 The Obama administration asserted that ISIL falls
within the scope of the 9/11 AUMF under the legal theory that:
[b]ased on ISIL’s longstanding relationship with [al-Qaeda] . . . and
continued desire to conduct [sic] attacks against U.S. persons and
interests . . . and ISIL’s position—supported by some individual
members and factions of [al-Qaeda]-aligned groups—that it is the true
inheritor of Usama bin Laden’s legacy, the President may rely on the
2001 AUMF as statutory authority for the use of force against ISIL,
notwithstanding the recent public split between [al-Qaeda’s] senior
leadership and ISIL.15
This theory essentially asserts that because ISIL was closely affiliated with alQaeda and because ISIL has replaced al-Qaeda as the U.S.’s primary threat in the
Middle East, ISIL is effectively the same as al-Qaeda and should be included under
the AUMF. The Trump administration has continued to rely on this precedent
established by President Obama, as his cabinet members have expressed that the 9/11
AUMF is sufficient to continue the United States’ military campaigns.16
Despite this rationalization, a number of law professors and legal scholars have
taken the position that the executive branch’s attempt to justify its actions against
ISIL by relying on the 9/11 AUMF is improper.17 The general consensus among
those taking this position is that the executive must seek additional authority to fight
ISIL through either a new AUMF or another form of congressional approval.18 While
this may be the “legally safer” route to take, it ignores the strong likelihood that
President Trump will be left without this type of authorization due to the divided
state of Congress.19 This creates an obvious issue because the interests of the United

13. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (codified
at 50 U.S.C. § 1541).
14. Lederman, supra note 12.
15. Id.
16. Andrew Rudalevige, Here’s Why the Trump Administration May Actually Want
Congress to Pass a New Authorization for Military Force, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/11/20/heres-why-the-trumpadministration-may-actually-want-congress-to-pass-a-new-authorization-for-militaryforce/?utm_term=.05f1ab186a5f [https://perma.cc/23G7-NHLU].
17. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The War Against ISIS is Unconstitutional, LAWFARE
(May 5, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/war-against-isis-unconstitutional
[https://perma.cc/PTX5-4YU9].
18. See, e.g., William S. Castle, The Argument for a New and Flexible Authorization for
the Use of Military Force, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509, 512 (2015).
19. Harold Hongju Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention, 53 HOUS. L.
REV. 971, 974 (2016) (“[W]e are living through a uniquely toxic U.S. domestic political

118

I NDI ANA LA W JOUR NA L SU PPL EM E NT

[Vol. 93:115

States—and the rest of the world—are best served by eradicating the threat ISIL
poses to worldwide security and stability.
ISIL is perhaps the most dangerous terror organization in the world.20 Although
the exact number of members is not known, it is estimated that the organization has
around 20,000 members.21 At the beginning of 2016, ISIL was responsible for at least
18,800 deaths in Iraq alone.22 Another dangerous aspect of the organization is its
ability to inspire others to commit acts of terror. Outside of Iraq and Syria, 1200
people have died in attacks either inspired or organized by ISIL.23 For example, the
Orlando nightclub shooting that took place in July 2016 is considered an act of terror
that was inspired by ISIL.24
Recently President Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin both declared
that ISIL has been defeated in Syria25 and Iraq Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi
announced that the Iraqi Military successfully liberated Iraq from ISIL.26 Despite the

environment, where interbranch cooperation has been almost entirely stalemated.”). In the
past, Congress was unable to pass such legislation leaving President Obama in the gray for
years despite the obvious threat posed by ISIL.
20. Andrew Flowers, Global Terrorism Declined Last Year—But Not in the West,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 30, 2016), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/global-terrorismdeclined-last-year-but-not-in-the-west/ [https://perma.cc/WM49-WX8W] (being responsible
for over 8000 confirmable deaths, ISIL was the deadliest terror group in 2015); see also
Annalise Lekas, Comment, #ISIS: The Largest Threat to World Peace Trending Now, 30
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 313, 314 (2015).
21. Harriet Agerholm, ISIS ‘Decimated’ in Iraq and Syria and Could Have Only 15,000
Fighters
Left,
US
Commander
Says,
INDEPENDENT (Aug. 11, 2016),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-syria-iraq-fighters-number-usmilitary-campaign-impact-how-many-soldiers-a7184886.html
[https://perma.cc/2GVZ-SU55].
22. Alastair Jamieson, ISIS Death Toll: 18,800 Killed in Iraq in 2 Years, U.N. Says, NBC
NEWS (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-death-toll-18-800killed-iraq-2-years-u-n499426 [https://perma.cc/2XJ4-JCK5]. Although incomparable to the
loss of human life, it is notable that ISIL has been responsible for the destruction of many
historical monuments and sites. Rachel Van Bokkem, History in Ruins: Cultural Heritage
Destruction
Around
the
World,
AM. HISTORICAL ASS’N
(Apr.
2017),
https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/april2017/history-in-ruins-cultural-heritage-destruction-around-the-world
[https://perma.cc/LNM2-9XQR].
23. Karen Yourish, Derek Watkins, Tom Giratikanon & Jasmine C. Lee, How Many
People Have Been Killed in ISIS Attacks Around the World, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/03/25/world/map-isis-attacks-around-theworld.html [https://perma.cc/9DEX-UXVS].
24. Ralph Ellis, Ashley Fantz, Eliott C. McLaughlin & Tim Hume, Orlando Shooting:
What Motivated a Killer?, CNN (June 14, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/13/us/orlandonightclub-shooting/ [https://perma.cc/BEE5-YTLX] (explaining that investigators found that
the gunman was most likely “self-radicalized” through consumption of “jihadist propaganda”
on the internet).
25. Hashem Osseiran, Has ISIS Really Been Defeated?, PAC. STANDARD (Dec 21, 2017),
https://psmag.com/news/has-the-demise-of-isis-been-exaggerated [https://perma.cc/LUK9AGYA].
26. Haider Al-Abadi (@HaiderAlAbadi), TWITTER (Dec. 9, 2017, 8:00 AM),
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success seen during 2017, it is too soon to declare victory while ISIL fighters remain
active and the organization maintains control over territory in North Africa and the
Middle East.
Even President Trump admits that the fight against ISIL is not over, as the
organization has “spread to other areas.”27 Considering the negative impacts of ISIL
on the global community, it is apparent that the security and stability of the United
States and its allies rely on our continued efforts to suppress and fully eliminate the
organization and its influence.
If an explicit congressional authorization—such as an Islamic State AUMF—is
truly required to continue using force against ISIL, the United States faces an
ultimatum of fighting an illegal war or remaining idle. This Note proposes an
alternative by making the argument that Congress has already approved the
executive’s use of force against ISIL.
This Note argues that Congress has already expressly or implicitly authorized the
use of force against ISIL through past legislation. I make this argument by applying
the existing evidence of authorization of force to the framework laid by
Youngstown.28 The argument is two-fold: that the hostilities are expressly authorized
under the 9/11 AUMF and that the hostilities are implicitly authorized by
congressional appropriations.
In Part I of this note, I outline both the birth and rise of ISIL. I examine the
background of the organization in order to illustrate why ISIL falls within the scope
of the 9/11 AUMF. Part II of this Note then explains the manners in which Congress
has already granted authorization to use force. In Part II.A, I outline how Congress
has explicitly authorized the executive to use force against ISIL through the 9/11
AUMF. In Part II.B, I explore how Congress has implicitly authorized the executive
to use force against ISIL through appropriations. In Part III, I examine how the
avenue used by the Obama administration could be used by President Trump as he
continues the campaign against ISIL.
I. THE BIRTH OF ISIL
In order to understand why ISIL falls within the scope of the 9/11 AUMF, an
examination of the history of ISIL is necessary. A common argument against ISIL
being covered by the existing AUMF is that it was not Congress’s intent to authorize
military action against groups that did not exist at the time the AUMF was passed.
This argument assumes a major simplification in the organization’s history: that ISIL

https://twitter.com/HaiderAlAbadi/status/939525191637532672
[https://perma.cc/NCV4-N982] (“We announce to the world the liberation of Iraq and the
defeat of Daesh”); Eric Levenson & Jomana Karadsheh, Iraq is ‘Fully Liberated’ from ISIS,
Its Military Says, CNN (Dec. 9, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/12/09/middleeast/iraq-isismilitary-liberated/index.html [https://perma.cc/X5W4-3UVF].
27. Donald Trump, President of the United States, Remarks by President Trump at
Signing of H.R. 2810, National Defense Authorization Act for FY2018 (Dec. 12, 2017)
(transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-presidenttrump-signing-h-r-2810-national-defense-authorization-act-fy2018/ [https://perma.cc/RKM5APCY]).
28. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952).
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did not exist until after the death of Usama bin-Laden, well after the influence of alQaeda began to decline. An exploration into the group’s origin and its involvement
in United States-Middle Eastern affairs illustrates how these arguments may be
misguided.
In 1991, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi29 founded Jamaat al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad
(JTWJ)—an Islamist group that would later become ISIL.30 Unlike al-Qaeda, which
had the primary goal of defeating the West, JTWJ aimed to overthrow the monarchy
established in Jordan and eventually take control of the Levant.31 Despite the
differences in goals, Usama bin-Laden—the leader of al-Qaeda from its formation
until his death in 2011—sent al-Zarqawi funding to establish training camps in the
region. Bin-Laden would continue sending money for this purpose until the
September 11th attacks.32
After the September 11th attacks, al-Zarqawi’s group fought the United States in
Afghanistan alongside al-Qaeda and the Taliban.33 Following the initial U.S.
airstrikes in Afghanistan, al-Zarqawi recruited fighters and mobilized resources to
prepare to oppose United States and coalition forces in Iraq.34 Al-Zarqawi became
notorious among other terror leaders in Iraq, eventually becoming the most important
contact for all terror organizations in the region.35
In 2004, al-Zarqawi swore a pledge of loyalty—known as bay’ah36—to bin-Laden
and changed JTWJ’s name to “al-Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers” or al-Qaeda in
Iraq (AQI), which brought the group into the greater al-Qaeda network.37 Despite

29. Although less widely known than Usama bin-Laden, al-Zarqawi was a high-profile
Islamist leader who, inter alia, was infamously known for killing Nicolas Berg in a video that
resulted in horror across the world. ‘Zarqawi’ Beheaded US Man in Iraq, BBC (May 13,
2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3712421.stm [https://perma.cc/2ATP-YEBS].
He was eventually killed by the United States during an airstrike in 2006. Mary Anne Weaver,
The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, ATLANTIC (June 8, 2006),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/07/the-short-violent-life-of-abu-musabal-zarqawi/304983/ [https://perma.cc/4LNW-5B8L].
30. AARON Y. ZELIN, WASH. INST. FOR NEAR E. POLICY, THE WAR BETWEEN ISIS AND ALQAEDA FOR SUPREMACY OF THE GLOBAL JIHADIST MOVEMENT 1 (2014),
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote_20_Zelin.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7277-3THK].
31. Id. The Levant is the region comprised of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria,
and southern Turkey (sometimes including Cyprus). Muhammad Ali Siddiqi, What is the
Levant?,
DAWN
(June
17,
2014),
http://www.dawn.com/news/1113209
[https://perma.cc/MLG6-ME6B].
32. Stanford University, Mapping Militant Organizations: The Islamic State (Oct. 23,
2017), http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/1
[https://perma.cc/VZU6-CVA6].
33. M. J. KIRDAR, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, AL QAEDA IN IRAQ 1 (2001),
https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/110614_
Kirdar_AlQaedaIraq_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NN4-Z2GM].
34. Id. at 3.
35. Id.
36. NORMAN CIGAR, AL-QAIDA, THE TRIBES, AND THE GOVERNMENT: LESSONS AND
PROSPECTS FOR IRAQ’S UNSTABLE TRIANGLE 18 (2015).
37. ZELIN, supra note 30, at 2.
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being aligned with al-Qaeda, AQI often acted in ways that frustrated al-Qaeda’s
leadership.38 Regardless, Al-Zarqawi, by instruction of al-Qaeda leadership, began
recruiting to expand the organization’s ranks. In early 2006, al-Zaraqawi brought
several lesser known organizations into the al-Qaeda network.39 These terror groups,
in addition to AQI, aligned into an umbrella organizational structure called “Majlis
Shura al-Mujhadein” (MSM).40 Al-Zaraqawi served as the leader of MSM until his
death in June 2006.41 Abu Hamza al-Muhajar was promoted to lead both AQI and
MSM after Al-Zaraqawi’s death.42
In October 2006, MSM made an announcement establishing itself as the Islamic
State in Iraq (ISI) and appointing Abu Omar al-Baghdadi43 as its leader.44 AlMuhajar45 then pledged bay’ah to al-Baghdadi, fully merging AQI into ISI in the
process.46 Even after al-Zarqawi’s death and the establishment of the Islamic State,
the group remained a part of the al-Qaeda network, sharing resources and
collaborating until 2014 when al-Qaeda severed its ties with what had become ISIL.47
Much of ISIL’s uprising can be attributed to the unrest in Syria. In the early 2010s,
a revolutionary movement known as the “Arab Spring” spread across the Middle
East.48 In 2011, the Arab Spring reached Syria, sparking demonstrations by both
Syrian youth and those experiencing economic hardship caused by Syrian President
Assad’s policy changes.49 The Syrian government responded with violence in an
attempt to quell the demonstrations.50 The opposite occurred and more Syrians began
opposing Assad in light of the extreme measures he took against his citizenry.51

38. Id. For example, Usama bin-Laden and Ayman al-Zawahri (the current leader of alQaeda) often instructed al-Zarqawi to stop committing acts of violence aimed toward Sunni
citizens, to which he refused compliance. Id. at 3.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Ahmed S. Hashim, The Islamic State: From al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate, 21
MIDDLE E. POL’Y COUNCIL 69 (2014).
43. Abu Omar al-Baghdadi was the first leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and was
succeeded by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-Husseini al-Qurashi, the first and current leader of
ISIL. See Anthony Shadid, Iraqi Insurgent Group Names New Leaders, N.Y. TIMES (May 16,
2010), http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/iraqi-insurgent-group-names-new-leaders/
?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=1 [https://perma.cc/2VNC-NT93].
44. ZELIN, supra note 30, at 2.
45. Abu Hamza al-Muhajar also served as the leader of MSM from June 2006 until
October 2006. The position then shifted to al-Baghdadi when the Islamic State in Iraq was
declared.
46. ZELIN, supra note 30, at 2.
47. Id. at 3.
48. For a background of the countries affected by the Arab Spring, see generally Arab
Uprisings,
BBC,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12813859
[https://perma.cc/M3V6-QHLH].
49. CHRISTOPHER PHILLIPS, LONDON SCH. OF ECON., AFTER THE ARAB SPRING: POWER
SHIFT IN THE MIDDLE EAST?: SYRIA’S BLOODY ARAB SPRING 38–39
(2012), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43464/ [https://perma.cc/UN2Y-EETB].
50. Id.
51. Id.

122

I NDI ANA LA W JOUR NA L SU PPL EM E NT

[Vol. 93:115

Eventually the citizens began rebelling against the Assad regime, resulting in the
current civil war.52 The chaos resulting from the conflict allowed ISIL to take control
of a significant portion of Syria, which further spread the group’s dominion and
influence.53
After building support in Syria, ISIL began laying claim to territory in Iraq and
Syria. After claiming Mosul in June 2014, ISIL declared a worldwide caliphate and
called for the support of other Islamist organizations.54 At the organization’s peak, it
controlled about a third of both Syria and Iraq.55 In early 2017, the group’s control
had been reduced to 52,700 square kilometers.56
In an effort to halt the growth of ISIL, the United States formed an anti-ISIL
coalition.57 Over sixty countries support the coalition, including the countries
comprising the European Union and the Arab League.58 To date, significant progress
has been made in the coalition’s campaign against ISIL. One year after ISIL declared
the worldwide caliphate, the anti-ISIL coalition had led more than 5500 airstrikes
against ISIL targets.59 At the end of 2016, U.S. officials announced that “US-led
airstrikes have killed up to 75% of [ISIL] fighters and 180 of its leaders.”60 Although

52. For a brief survey of the Syrian Civil War, see generally Kathy Gilsinan, The
Confused Person’s Guide to the Syrian Civil War, ATLANTIC (Oct. 29, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/syrian-civil-war-guideisis/410746/ [https://perma.cc/X4ZX-PNK8].
53. Stephen Zunes, The U.S. and the Rise of ISIS, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 8, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-zunes/the-us-and-the-rise-of-is_b_8754584.html
[https://perma.cc/6QDW-KWER].
54. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
55. See Henry Johnsen, Mapped: The Islamic State Is Losing Its Territory—and Fast,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 16, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/16/mapped-the-islamicstate-is-losing-its-territory-and-fast/ [https://perma.cc/CBV5-J8FH].
56. SETH G. JONES, JAMES DOBBINS, DANIEL BYMAN, CHRISTOPHER S. CHIVVIS, BEN
CONNABLE, JEFFREY MARTINI, ERIC ROBINSON & NATHAN CHANDLER, ROLLING BACK THE
ISLAMIC STATE 9 (2017), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1912.html
[https://perma.cc/6FP7-EQMU]; see also, Rukmini Callimachi (@rcallimachi), TWITTER (Oct.
17,
2017,
5:48
PM),
https://twitter.com/rcallimachi/status/920451475624677377
[https://perma.cc/QC9Z-G4S4] (reporting that ISIL holds only 10,210 square kilometers in
Iraq and Syria).
57. Sebastian Payne, What the 60-Plus Members of the Anti-Islamic State Coalition Are
Doing,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
25,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/09/25/what-the-60-membersof-the-anti-islamic-state-coalition-are-doing/?utm_term=.46cd60eb3ebd
[https://perma.cc/A6CR-MX5Y].
58. Id.
59. Jim Michaels, Islamic State Recruiting Offsets 15,000 Killed by Airstrikes in Past
Year, USA TODAY (July 29, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/07/29/
air-campaign-kills-15000-isis-militants-pentagon-iraq-syria/30750327/
[https://perma.cc/R6RD-CAVK].
60. Nicole Gaouette, Obama has Degraded ISIS. Can Trump Finish the Job?, CNN (Dec.
14, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/14/politics/isis-degradedtrump-policy/ [https://perma.cc/SR33-UHA8].

2018]

Congressional Authorization of the Campaign Against ISIL

123

the organization’s numbers are thinning, the Pentagon has reported that “a lot of work
remains” before the conflict with ISIL is concluded.61
II. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to declare war.62 Despite this
allocation of power, the Constitution instructs that the President shall be the
Commander in Chief.63 These provisions attempt to balance the power between the
two branches by giving the President control of the military, but, generally, requiring
authorization from Congress before the military can be used.
The Court explored this balance of powers in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, where Justice Jackson outlined that the level of the President’s power
fluctuates with “disjunction or conjunction” in relation to congressional power.64 To
illustrate this fluctuation, Jackson described the President’s power in three different
instances, which he referred to as zones. He outlined that the executive is in the first
zone, where its power is at its highest, when “the President acts pursuant to an express
or implied authorization of Congress.”65 Continuing, the executive is in the third
zone, where its power is at its lowest, “when the President takes measures
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress.”66 Finally, in the
middle is the second zone, or the “zone of twilight,” where “the President acts in
absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority.”67 It is within this zone
that the executive may act using its own independent powers because either power
has either been distributed to both Congress and the President, or the distribution of
powers is unknown.68
In order for the President’s decision to engage in military action against ISIL to
be considered in Youngstown’s first zone, Congress must have given authorization.
Congress, at this time, has not formally declared war against ISIL; however, courts
have generally held that such a formal declaration of war is not required.69
Alternatively, in recent instances Congress has enacted statutes to expressly

61. Id.
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
63. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
64. 343 U.S. 579, 635–39 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Although Jackson’s opinion
is only the concurrence it is treated as the controlling opinion. See, e.g., Edward T. Swaine,
The Political Economy of Youngstown, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 263, 269 (2010).
65. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635.
66. Id. at 637.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“[I]t is
constitutionally permissible for Congress to use another means than a formal declaration of
war to give its approval.”). In fact, Congress rarely declares war in a formal manner. Berk v.
Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715, 722 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d sub nom., Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d
1039 (2d Cir. 1971) (explaining that in the 159 instances in which U.S. armed forces were
used abroad spanning from 1798 to 1945, only six involved a formal declaration of war by any
party). Congress has not formally declared war since declaring war on Bulgaria, Hungary, and
Romania in 1942. See H.R.J. Res. 319, 77th Cong. (1942) (enacted); H.R.J. Res. 320, 77th
Cong. (1942) (enacted); H.R.J. Res. 321, 77th Cong. (1942) (enacted).
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authorize the use of military force.70 For example, Congress authorized the Gulf War,
the Afghanistan War, and the Iraq War through AUMFs rather than formal
declarations of war.71 While these are means of express authorization, Congress can
also implicitly authorize the executive’s actions. “The Supreme Court has recognized
that, as a general matter, appropriation statutes may ‘stand[] as confirmation and
ratification of the action of the Chief Executive.’”72 In this instance, it is possible that
Congress has expressly (through the 9/11 AUMF) or implicitly (through
appropriations) authorized the executive to use force to combat ISIL. Such
authorization would put the executive at its apex of authority to continue the
campaign against ISIL.
A. Express Authorization
On September 12, 2001, the White House proposed a resolution to Congress
requesting authorization of the use of force against not only those “nations,
organizations, and persons” directly linked to the events of September 11, but also
to use any “required action to deter and preempt any future acts of terrorism or
aggression against the United States.”73 By proposing this resolution, President Bush
seemingly requested that Congress give the executive the authority to engage in
armed conflict with terrorist organizations everywhere in the world.74 Although
Congress reeled in Bush’s initial resolution from any terrorist anywhere to the
comparatively narrower scope of “those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001,” the scope of authorization Congress granted to the
executive in the 9/11 AUMF remained broad.75
The 9/11 AUMF is an express authorization from Congress, meaning that it places
the President in Youngstown’s first zone where executive power is at its greatest. In
order to determine if the 9/11 AUMF can be applied to ISIL, the scope of
authorization must first be examined.
1. Methods of Inclusion
At the time the AUMF was passed, Congress had some intelligence regarding the
extent of bin-Laden, al-Qaeda, and the Taliban’s involvement in and responsibility
for the September 11th attacks.76 Despite this, the AUMF names no specific parties.

70. The AUMF has become the usual manner of Congressional authorization, rather than
a formal declaration of war. Scott M. Sullivan, Interpreting Force Authorization, 43 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 241, 241 (2015).
71. Id.
72. Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kosovo, 24 Op. O.L.C. 327, 332 (2000)
(citing Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111, 116 (1947)).
73. 107 Cong. Rec S.9949 (2001).
74. See id.; see also Richard F. Grimmett, Authorization for Use of Military Force in
Response to the 9/11 Attacks (P.L. 107-40): Legislative History, CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERV.
(2007).
75. Authorization for Use of Military Force, supra note 13.
76. President Bush Addresses the Nation, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2001),
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Instead, Congress used only general nouns regarding “nations, persons, or
organizations.”77 The broad language of this authorization allowed al-Qaeda, the
Taliban, and other terror organizations to fall within the scope of the AUMF. This
language should include ISIL within the scope of authorization for the reasons
discussed in this Part.78
The scope of the 9/11 AUMF should be treated as a web that is composed of a
center with several strands sprouting outward. The nations, persons, or organizations
directly involved in the September 11th attacks are at the center of this web.
Naturally, under the 9/11 AUMF the “persons” and “organizations” directly
responsible for the September 11th attacks, such as Usama bin-Laden and the “core
al-Qaeda group,” fall within the scope of “those persons or organizations” Congress
has authorized force against.79 It is important to note that while most AUMFs have
targeted a specific country or countries, the 9/11 AUMF gave authorization to use
force against “organizations or persons.”80 Prior to this particular AUMF, Congress
had never given authorization in such a broad manner.81
Although not every member of the core al-Qaeda group was directly involved in
the September 11th attacks, the AUMF covers these individuals for their membership
in the culpable organization.82 These members are a part of the organization that

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/
bushaddress_092001.html [https://perma.cc/MTF5-KF7P].
77. Authorization for Use of Military Force, supra note 13.
78. There are some scholars who argue that the 2002 Iraq AUMF authorizes hostilities
against ISIL, at least in Iraq. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, The 2002 Iraq AUMF Almost Certainly
Authorizes the President to Use Force Today in Iraq (and Might Authorize the Use of Force
in Syria), LAWFARE (June 13, 2014), https://www.lawfareblog.com/2002-iraq-aumf-almostcertainly-authorizes-president-use-force-today-iraq-and-might-authorize-use
[https://perma.cc/MNA9-HHMN]. The Obama administration previously asserted that
although the 2002 AUMF “‘is no longer used for any U.S. government activities,’” it could be
used as authorization to combat ISIL; however, that authorization would be limited to Iraq.
Charlie Savage, Obama Sees Iraq Resolution as a Legal Basis for Airstrikes, Official Says,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/world/americas/obamasees-iraq-resolution-as-a-legal-basis-for-airstrikes-official-says.html
[https://perma.cc/W6VB-9DFA].
79. The Obama administration recognized the al-Qaeda organization operating in
Pakistan as the “core al-Qaeda” group. The administration defines al-Qaeda’s affiliates as
“groups that have aligned with al-Qaeda” and includes al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, alShabaab, al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, al-Qaeda in Iraq, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, and Lashkare-Taiba. In reality, the core al-Qaeda only recognized six al-Qaeda affiliate organizations: alQaeda in Iraq, al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Jabhat al-Nusra,
al-Shabaab, and the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus. KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN, AEI CRITICAL
THREATS PROJECT, THE AL-QAEDA NETWORK 11–14 (2013), http://www.aei.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/09/-the-al-qaeda-network-a-new-framework-for-defining-theenemy_133443407958.pdf [https://perma.cc/TM2N-CZUN].
80. RICHARD F. GRIMMET, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF
MILITARY FORCE IN RESPONSE TO 9/11 ATTACKS (P.L. 107-40): LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
RS22357, at 4 (2007), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22357.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QJ5T-W7H5].
81. Id.
82. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on
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caused the attacks and would therefore also fall within the center of the web.
Considering that the AUMF aimed to “prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States by such . . . organizations,”83 the scope is
reasonable because all members of al-Qaeda inherently pose a threat to the United
States and its citizens.84 Using the same reasoning, al-Qaeda members who joined
after the attacks are equally dangerous and should be covered by the 9/11 AUMF as
well.85
Parties that are covered by the AUMF due to their association with al-Qaeda
(rather than their membership in the organization) fall on the “strands” of the web.
For example, some parties are covered by the AUMF because they “harbored such
organizations or persons.” The Taliban is a primary example of such an organization.
The Taliban had no direct connection to the September 11th attacks; instead, this
organization was implicated because it harbored and provided aid to Usama binLaden and al-Qaeda.86 The Supreme Court confirmed that the Taliban fell within the
scope of the 9/11 AUMF in Hamdi, when it explained that “[t]here can be no doubt
that individuals who fought against the United States in Afghanistan as part of the
Taliban, an organization known to have supported the al Qaeda terrorist network
responsible for those attacks, are individuals Congress sought to target in passing the
AUMF.”87 From this holding, it can be concluded that any “organization that joins
al Qaeda in its conflict with the United States, even after September 11th, can be
viewed as part of the ‘organization’ against which Congress authorized force.”88
Further, courts have held that, “[i]n addition to members of al-Qaeda and the
Taliban,” the 9/11 AUMF applies to “members of ‘associated forces.’”89 The court
in Hamlily held that a group constitutes an associated force if it is a co-belligerent as
defined under the laws of war.90 Although the court in Hamlily determined that the
international laws of war should be used to interpret what constitutes an “associated
force,” there is no evidence that Congress intended international laws to limit the
9/11 AUMF’s authorization.91 The Obama administration asserted that in order to be

Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2108 (2005).
83. Authorization for Use of Military Force, supra at 13.
84. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 82, at 2107–17.
85. Id. at 2108–09.
86. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
87. Id.
88. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 82, at 2110. C.f. CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS
276 (2015) (explaining that Jeh Johnson held the position that al-Shabaab was not covered by
the AUMF because there was not enough evidence to prove that the organization “had joined
the broader fight against the United States and its allies”).
89. Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 74. (D.D.C. 2009). Inclusion of “associated
forces” is consistent with congressional intent because it includes groups closely affiliated
with al-Qaeda that pose a threat to U.S. security but prevents worldwide authorization of use
of force.
90. Id.
91. Al-Bihani v. Obama 590 F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (relying on the definitions
outlined in the Military Commissions Act of 2006 and 2009 to determine if the Plaintiff fell
within the scope of the 9/11 AUMF for detainment purposes; these acts apply the AUMF to
“those who purposefully and materially support such forces in hostilities against U.S.
Coalition partners”).
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an associated force, the group must be “(1) an organized, armed group that (2)
aligned itself with al-Qaeda, and (3) entered the fight against the United States and
its coalition partners.”92 The position that ISIL is an “associated force” under the 9/11
AUMF has been maintained by the Trump Administration.93
2. ISIL’s Inclusion Under the 9/11 AUMF
Even in the absence of an ISIL-specific AUMF, President Obama asserted that he
had “the authority to address the threat from ISIL” due to the 9/11 AUMF.94 An
application of the AUMF’s scope to ISIL justifies both President Obama and
President Trump’s reliance on the 9/11 AUMF to combat ISIL.
The most immediate cause for ISIL’s inclusion under the AUMF would be if the
organization holds some responsibility for the September 11th attacks. This
methodology will not work because there is no evidence that ISIL (at the time, JTWJ)
played any role in the attacks.95 Regardless, it is still possible that ISIL falls within
the AUMF’s initial scope. All members of the al-Qaeda organization fall within the
9/11 AUMF’s authorization, even if they joined al-Qaeda after the September 11th
attacks.96 This may include ISIL in the scope of the AUMF because it joined the alQaeda network after the attacks.97 While this cause for inclusion would work for an
organization that merged with al-Qaeda; it does not work for affiliate organizations
because their members do not belong to the core al-Qaeda. Therefore, this cause for
inclusion is likely insufficient because ISIL never merged with al-Qaeda; meaning
that its members did not belong to the core al-Qaeda group.98
Although ISIL was a part of the al-Qaeda network, the group was an affiliate
organization and not a part of the core al-Qaeda group in Pakistan. While one may
argue that every al-Qaeda affiliate organization is implicated in the same manner,
this is an incorrect analysis of congressional intent. If every al-Qaeda affiliate fell
within the scope of the AUMF, the authorization would reach far outside the Middle
East to all areas of the world.99 By denying President Bush’s initial resolution,

92. SAVAGE, supra note 88, at 275.
93. Letter from Charles Faulkner, Deputy Assistant Sec’y of St. for Reg’l, Glob., and
Functional Aff., to Bob Corker, Chairman of the Comm. on Foreign Rel. (Aug. 2, 2017),
https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000015d-a3bf-d43a-a3dd-b3bf14170000,
[https://perma.cc/7MGK-H9CJ].
94. Lederman, supra note 12.
95. Cf. Graham Cronogue, A New AUMF: Defining Combatants in the War on Terror, 22
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 377, 381–82 (2012) (explaining why responsibility for the
September 11th attacks cannot be attributed to al-Qaeda affiliate groups).
96. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 82, at 2108.
97. ISIL, under a different name, fought with al-Qaeda in 2001 and officially swore
allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2004. See supra notes 29–36 and accompanying text.
98. Id. There are likely some members of ISIL that at one time were members of al-Qaeda.
However, for the purposes of this Note I am arguing that the AUMF should cover ISIL in its
entirety rather than specific members.
99. Al-Qaeda affiliates are present in countries from west Africa to east Asia.
Additionally, al-Qaeda cells are present in many western countries, including the United States
and
most
of
Europe.
See
Al-Qaeda,
GLOBAL
SECURITY,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-qaida.htm
[https://perma.cc/KF5T-
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Congress made it clear that it did not want to give the executive worldwide
authorization to use force against every terror organization.100 Therefore, such an
interpretation would be contrary to Congress’s intent when the 9/11 AUMF was
passed.
If the 9/11 AUMF includes al-Qaeda affiliates, presumably it would only include
those closest to the core al-Qaeda group to avoid worldwide authorization. ISIL
would meet this qualifying criterion because it is one of the few organizations that
swore allegiance to al-Qaeda and was officially recognized by the al-Qaeda core.101
This may still be a problematic interpretation because the affiliates officially
recognized by the al-Qaeda core spread from West Africa to parts of South Asia and
Eurasia.102 Although this may not constitute worldwide authorization, it would grant
an authorization to use force against organizations that are unlikely to pose a future
security threat to the United States.103 This is the type of authorization Congress
wanted to avoid when it denied Bush’s proposed AUMF and implemented the 9/11
AUMF.104 While authorization in this fashion is possible, relying on an associated
force analysis would include ISIL while excluding organizations that have no history
with the United States. Therefore, whether ISIL is an associated force must be
determined.
When determining whether an organization is an associated force, a functional
rather than formalistic approach should be used.105 This is because there cannot be
an exhaustive list of which organizations are considered an associated force.106 When
applying ISIL to the associated force elements outlined by the Obama administration,
the organization clearly constitutes an associated force. As previously outlined, a
terror organization is considered an associated force if it is “(1) an organized, armed
group that (2) aligned itself with al-Qaeda, and (3) entered the fight against the
United States and its coalition partners.”107
ISIL is an organized armed group and it was aligned with al-Qaeda for at least a
decade.108 Additionally, the organization fought against the United States and its
coalition partners in Afghanistan in 2001, in Iraq from 2004 to the present day, and
in Syria from 2014 to the present day.109 Furthermore, inclusion of ISIL as an
associated force is consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hamdi, where the

GV2J].
100. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 79.
102. Id.
103. See infra notes 113–14 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
105. Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75. (D.D.C. 2009) (“With respect to the
criteria to be used in determining whether someone was ‘part of’ the ‘Taliban or al Qaida or
associated forces,’ the Court will not attempt to set forth an exhaustive list because such
determinations must be made on an individualized basis. But this Court will, by necessity,
employ an approach that is more functional than formal, as there are no settled criteria for
determining who is a ‘part of’ an organization such as al Qaeda.”).
106. Id.
107. SAVAGE, supra note 88, at 275.
108. See supra notes 29–47 and accompanying text.
109. Id.
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Court concluded that the Taliban fell within the scope of the 9/11 AUMF because it
fought against the United States alongside al-Qaeda.110 Therefore ISIL should be
considered an associated force and should be included within the authorization
created by the 9/11 AUMF.
There are a few compelling, but ultimately misguided, arguments against the
inclusion of ISIL within the scope of the 9/11 AUMF. The first counterargument is
that Congress did not intend to authorize any armed conflict with ISIL because the
organization did not exist when the September 11th attacks occurred. This argument
is valid only if the name of an organization is the key factor when determining
whether a person or organization is included within the scope of authorization. As
established, the group, although under a different name at the time, was part of the
al-Qaeda network for a decade, supported Usama bin-Laden and al-Qaeda in efforts
made against the United States, and still threatens future terror attacks against the
United States and its allies. If ISIL had not changed its name in 2014, it would
presumably still be covered by the AUMF. To rule that ISIL is not included within
the AUMF because it did not “exist” in 2001, would be the equivalent of ruling that
an organization does not fall within the scope of the AUMF because it went through
a rearrangement of organizational structure.111 Applying authorizations in this
manner would seemingly create a legal loophole where an enemy of the United States
could render the U.S. Commander in Chief powerless by simply going through a
“rebranding” phase. Ruling groups outside the scope of the AUMF in this manner
severely hinders the executive’s ability to “prevent any future acts” by “such
organizations” because terror organizations tend to frequently reorganize.112
A second counterargument is that interpreting the 9/11 AUMF in this manner
could create future wars against unknown enemies in unspecified regions. As the
AUMF is currently being used, the authorization cannot be consolidated upon a
single group or even into one particular region. Originally the AUMF authorized the
use of force in Afghanistan, but it is now being used to authorize force in various
countries throughout the Middle East and Africa. For example, in addition to ISIL,
the Obama Administration used the AUMF to combat al-Shabaab, a terror
organization in Somalia.113 Al-Shabaab, although dangerous, had no involvement in

110. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
111. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 82, at 2111 (“Interpreting the term ‘organization’
to include only groups that at the lowest possible abstraction were responsible for the
September 11 attacks would . . . permit the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks to take
themselves outside the ambit of the AUMF through the simple mechanisms of changing
organizational names or rearranging organizational structure.”).
112. “Congress must have known that the traits of targets would change over time.”
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Military Force and Violence, but Neither War nor Hostilities,
64 DRAKE L. REV. 995, 1023 (2016) (outlining how the targets of authorized force can change
over time without further congressional approval).
113. Charlie Savage, Eric Schmitt & Mark Mazzetti, Obama Expands War with Al Qaeda
to Include Shabab in Somalia, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/
2016/11/27/us/politics/obama-expands-war-with-al-qaeda-to-include-shabab-in-somalia.html
[https://perma.cc/M7TU-XP26]. But see Pierce Rand, Back to the Congressional Drawing
Board; Inapplicability of the AUMF to Al-Shabaab and Other New Faces of Terrorism, 37
LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 117 (2015) (explaining the background of Al-Shabaab and
the difficulty of applying the 9/11 AUMF).
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the September 11th attacks, has weak connections with al-Qaeda, and has not entered
into hostilities directly with the United States or its allies.114 Arguably, if the 9/11
AUMF can be applied to groups such as al-Shabaab, it could be continuously used
to authorize hostilities against terror organizations so long as some remote
connection to al-Qaeda exists. This cannot be the correct interpretation. However,
the inclusion of groups like ISIL in the scope of the 9/11 AUMF is consistent with
congressional intent.
By denying President Bush’s initial resolution, Congress made it apparent that it
did not want to allow the President to use force worldwide in an effort to prevent any
and all future terror threats. For this reason, the AUMF could not be applied to a
terror organization in South America that has no ties to al-Qaeda.115 It may also be
incorrect to apply the AUMF to organizations that have never directly threatened the
United States and maintain only loose ties to al-Qaeda. However, the AUMF is being
used correctly when it is applied to ISIL due to its deep ties to al-Qaeda and the threat
it poses to the United States and its allies.
A final counterargument is that the AUMF, framed to include ISIL, potentially
creates a war that could last forever, which could not have been the intent of
Congress. The AUMF has already been used to authorize conflict for over a decade
and, if left unchecked, could be used well into the future. Because the authorization
granted by the 9/11 AUMF continues to change as new threats emerge, there may be
no natural end to the hostilities authorized by the AUMF. Although this seems
problematic, it is hardly the first time Congress has granted such indefinite
authorization. During the Vietnam War Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution, which was used as a blanket authorization against conflict in Southeast
Asia—the region specified within the resolution.116 Congress later repealed this
resolution because it did not wish to grant such broad authorization.117 When
considering previous legislation, it is apparent that the indefinite nature of the 9/11
AUMF does not undermine its validity, especially because Congress could ultimately
repeal the AUMF. The 9/11 AUMF may not be an ideal piece of legislation, but it
was written in a way that allows continuation of an indefinite war in various
regions.118

114. Rand, supra note 113, at 141–46 (arguing that the 9/11 AUMF should not include AlShabaab because the group has weak connections to Al-Qaeda and has had little impact on the
security of the United States and its allies).
115. For example, a group such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia may have
fallen under the scope of the AUMF requested by President Bush, but surely falls outside the
scope of the AUMF Congress actually passed. See Who Are the Farc?, BBC (Nov. 24, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36605769 [https://perma.cc/E5B9-QHA9].
116. ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION (1998),
https://www.britannica.com/event/Gulf-of-Tonkin-Resolution
[https://perma.cc/XF7A-FMLL].
117. Id. Unlike the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the 2001 AUMF has not been repealed. In
fact, many members of Congress insist that it gives the President the authorization to fight
ISIL. Peter Beinart, Why Won’t the GOP Declare War on ISIS?, ATLANTIC (May 28, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/05/congress-aumf-isis-war/394268/
[https://perma.cc/8T2U-4KFH] (explaining that Senate hawks, such as Marco Rubio, believe
the 2001 AUMF constitutes authorization for the conflict with ISIL).
118. Samuel Moyn, Debating the Legacy of the Post-9/11 ‘Forever War’, COUNCIL ON
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Many claim that the 9/11 AUMF should no longer be in effect because the war
against al-Qaeda is over. For an apt comparison, consider the famous Greek myth of
Hercules and the Hydra. In this story, Hercules faces a hydra with numerous heads.
When Hercules cuts off one of the heads, another grows in its place. It is only after
the final head is removed that Hercules can claim he has defeated the hydra.119 To
claim that the AUMF is no longer applicable because Usama bin-Laden is dead or
because “al-Qaeda” has lost influence is to pretend that the hydra is somehow a
different beast simply because some of the heads have been removed. ISIL has
significant connections to al-Qaeda and poses the type of threat Congress wanted to
eliminate when enacting the 9/11 AUMF. Therefore, ISIL should fall within the
scope of explicit authorization.
B. Implicit Authorization
As previously stated, Congress denied President Obama’s request for new
legislation authorizing hostilities with ISIL. While it is true that Congress failed to
pass a new AUMF, it is important to note that Congress is not divided on whether
force should be used against ISIL. Instead, Congress is divided in deciding how broad
or narrow the authorization should be drawn. Senator Rand Paul, joined by several
Senate Democrats, wanted the authorization to be limited to the use of force against
ISIL in Iraq and Syria.120 Comparatively, some lawmakers, like Senators Lindsey
Graham and John McCain, have expressed support for an AUMF with no limitations
on the executive’s actions toward ISIL.121 Meanwhile, many members of Congress
believe that the 9/11 AUMF is sufficient to cover any military action the executive
takes in opposition to ISIL.122
Further, a fraction of Congress opposes a new AUMF simply because they do not
want to face the political consequences of declaring a new war.123 The political
consequences of supporting a war were made obvious by the 2016 election, when
many politicians faced scrutiny for approving the Iraq AUMF in 2002.124 Some

FOREIGN REL. (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/debating-legality-post911-forever-war [https://perma.cc/5795-JYH9] (criticizing Congress for enacting what is
essentially a second Gulf of Tonkin Resolution).
119. Perseus
Project,
The
Lernean
Hydra,
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/Herakles/hydra.html [https://perma.cc/8RWK-SV9D].
120. Beinart, supra note 117.
121. See id.
122. Id.
123. Gregory A. Wagner, Note, Warheads on Foreheads: The Applicability of the 9/11
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congressional members have called their colleagues “cowards” for their
unwillingness to pass a new AUMF.125 Regardless of intent, there is an obvious
disincentive to passing a new authorization, especially when the opposition to ISIL
continues without one.126
One might argue that Congress acquiesced to the assertion that the 9/11 AUMF is
sufficient by failing to act upon President Obama’s proposed resolution. Failure to
act could constitute acquiescence because only a “few of the members of Congress
who are refusing to pass a new authorization are also claiming that the president lacks
legal authority to take action.”127 Assuming Congress’s actions do not constitute
acquiescence, Congress has authorized the use of force in another manner.
Despite failing to pass a new AUMF, Congress has passed legislation that
provides funding for engaging in combat with ISIL. In the 2016 Fiscal Year Spending
Bill, Congress allocated 58.6 billion dollars to fund Overseas Contingency
Operations and the Global War on Terror.128 Hal Rogers, the previous chairman of
the House Appropriations Committee, indicated that a portion of these funds were
for the purpose of “combat[ing] the threat presented by ISIL.”129 Similar funding was
proposed by President Obama and requested by the Department of Defense for the
2017 fiscal year.130 President Trump continued the request for funding in his first
budget blueprint where he asked for an increase of over three billion dollars to be
allocated to the campaign against ISIL.131 Congress responded to these requests in
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the 2017 National Defense Act, where it further increased the funding appropriated
to fight ISIL and requested details on the executive branch’s combat strategy.132
The funds Congress has allocated for the purpose of combating ISIL may serve
as the authorization needed under a Youngstown analysis. In Youngstown, Justice
Jackson explained that the President’s powers are at their highest when the President
acts with express or implied authority. In this case Congress, through the means of
funding, has authorized, at least implicitly, the President to engage in hostilities
against ISIL.
It is well established that “Congress may express approval through the
appropriations process.”133 The Supreme Court supports this proposition, as the
Court has held in many cases that Congress authorized executive action through
appropriations.134 Prior to the introduction of the War Powers Resolution, Congress
“authorized U.S. involvement in armed conflict at least in part through appropriation
laws.”135 The reasoning of this policy is logical because Congress would not fund
something it does not support.
Although appropriations constituted authorization in the past, the War Powers
Resolution seemingly prohibited this practice when it was passed in 1973.136 On its
face, the War Powers Resolution prevents authorization of hostilities through
appropriations because it states: “Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces
into hostilities . . . shall not be inferred – (1) from any provision of law . . . including
any provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically
authorizes the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities . . . .”137
However, it is possible that the War Powers Resolution “‘does not bar later
Congresses from authorizing military operations through appropriations,’ because
the Constitution forbids an earlier Congress from binding a later one.”138 If this
section of the War Powers Resolution does not bind the current Congress,
authorization to use force could be granted through appropriations.
One of the most commonly referenced instance of authorization through
appropriations is the Vietnam War. Congress appropriated billions of dollars to

132. National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 2810, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted Pub. L.
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134. See, e.g., Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111, 116 (1947)
(holding that appropriation of funds “stands as confirmation and ratification of the action of
the Chief Executive”); see also Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kosovo, supra note
72, at 332 (outlining instances where the Supreme Court held that Congress authorized
executive action though means of appropriation).
135. Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kosovo, supra note 72, at 333–39 (giving
examples where appropriations were used as authorization for hostilities, spanning from
hostilities with the Native American tribes to the Vietnam War).
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support the Vietnam War without ever actually declaring war. Although a few
members of Congress ensured they were not voting “to approve the sending of
combat troops into South Vietnam,” Congress continued expanding the draft and
appropriating money for the cause.139 This funding could be—and by supporters
was—construed as congressional authorization for the war.140 In fact, courts even
held that the congressional appropriations for the war served as a means of
authorization.141
Admittedly, using the Vietnam War as an example for implicit authorization is
somewhat problematic because it is difficult to determine the true intent of Congress.
It is possible that Congress was implicitly authorizing the Vietnam War through
appropriations to avoid political consequences. Alternatively, it could be that
Congress appropriated funding for the sole purpose of supporting the troops that were
already fighting in Vietnam.142 For example, Senator McGovern, a senator during
the Vietnam War, said the following in regard to funding the war: “‘[I]t involves
more [than] the throwing of a rope to a man in the water. We may have cause to
question how he got there, but he is there, he is a human being, he is our friend and
a member of our family . . . .’”143 Testimonies like this suggest that lawmakers,
regardless of their position on the war itself, would continue appropriating funds to
support U.S. troops. If the purpose of funding is to ensure American troops remained
fully supplied, it is difficult to argue that such appropriations constitute any type of
authorization.144
However, the conflict with ISIL is significantly different from the Vietnam War,
namely because an absence of funding would not put the lives of American troops
directly at risk. For the most part, our military efforts against ISIL have been
primarily composed of tactical airstrikes.145 The only ground forces allocated to the
campaign against ISIL are the few special operations troops, whose primary purpose
is training Syrian rebels and providing support to the Iraqi military.146 In this
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?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6dfc05dcab9b [https://perma.cc/LNK6-QPXE] (reporting “2,000

2018]

Congressional Authorization of the Campaign Against ISIL

135

instance, if Congress did not appropriate funds the world effort to suppress the threat
of ISIL would be heavily undermined, but U.S. troops would not be exposed to
heightened danger—at least not to the extent of those fighting in Vietnam—due to
the lack of congressional support.
Although appropriations can constitute authorization, it should not be presumed.
When considering whether an appropriation statute is a signal of approval or
disapproval from Congress, “[t]he whole question depends on the intention of
Congress as expressed in the statutes.”147 In addition to intent, Congress must act
with knowledge of the purpose of the funding in order for an appropriation to
constitute authorization.148 In this instance there are several indicators that Congress
did have knowledge of—and supported—the purpose of the appropriations.
The first indicator that Congress acted with knowledge is the testimony of the
chairman of the House Appropriations Committee.149 As previously stated, the
chairman indicated that a portion of appropriated funds were for the purpose of
combating ISIL.150 Such indications have continued, as spending legislation directly
outlines that funds are allocated for the purpose of fighting ISIL.151 Furthermore, the
reasonable use of the funds should also be considered. Funds have been appropriated
specifically to engage in hostilities in both Iraq and Syria.152 It would be unreasonable
to conclude that none of the appropriated funds are to be used to engage in hostilities
against ISIL—the main force opposing the United States in the region.153
A final, but perhaps less clear, indicator is the opinions of the constituents
lawmakers have been elected to serve. U.S. citizens have overwhelmingly expressed
that the threat of ISIL is one of their top concerns.154 Due to the fear of ISIL, seventyone percent of Americans believe that the ability of a terrorist organization to launch
an attack on the United States is at least as high as it was on September 11th.155
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Regardless of security concerns, a majority of Americans, regardless of political
affiliation, support the campaign against ISIL, and at least half of Americans believe
that the United States should be more involved in subduing ISIL.156 It is a reasonable
conclusion that lawmakers have acted on behalf of their constituents by funding the
campaign against ISIL, thus giving the President authorization through
appropriations.
In the Constitution, there is no required manner by which Congress must “declare
war,” meaning that appropriations can serve as authorization.157 If Congress has
knowledge and its intent is obvious, appropriations can be considered evidence of
approval.158 Three factors indicate these requirements have been met: (1) the direct
testimony of the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, (2) the appropriation of
funds for use of force in a region where ISIL is the major enemy combatant, and (3)
the desires of American citizens. Under these conditions it is apparent that Congress
used appropriations to authorize the use of force against ISIL.
III. ISIL AND THE TRUMP PRESIDENCY
Although it has been difficult to predict almost anything about how the Trump
administration addresses U.S. foreign policy, it is safe to assume that subduing ISIL
will remain on the agenda. During his campaign, President Trump frequently made
promises that, if elected, he would eliminate the threat of ISIL.159 Although there has
not been an increase in the use of military force against ISIL, the campaign against
ISIL has continued steadily through both the presidential transition and Trump’s first
year as President.160 Trump has also recognized that despite the decline of ISIL’s
influence in Iraq and Syria, the group remains a threat because of its presence
elsewhere.161 Based on Trump’s rhetoric and his continuous request for funding to
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combat ISIL,162 it seems that he, unsurprisingly, will continue the use of military
force against the organization into the indefinite future.
Despite the stark contrast between President Trump and former President
Obama’s political ideologies, Trump has followed in Obama’s footsteps by relying
on the 9/11 AUMF as justification for using force against ISIL. Seemingly, the
administration is using the same “associated forces” legal theory as its
predecessor.163 Considering that Congress is controlled by Republicans, Trump
could have simply requested a new AUMF to authorize hostilities against ISIL.164 If
such a request were made, there exists the possibility that Congress would refuse to
pass legislation due to the still-existing disagreement on how much power should be
granted to the executive.165 Trump’s cabinet has suggested it would support a new
form of authorization being passed, but ultimately contends that the 9/11 AUMF is
sufficient authorization.166
One concern the Trump administration should have is the possibility of the 9/11
AUMF being repealed. In June 2017 an amendment to the 2018 Defense
Appropriations Bill was passed by the House of Representatives’ Appropriations
Committee that, if enacted, would have repealed the AUMF.167 The amendment was
introduced by Representative Barbara Lee, who argued that the 9/11 AUMF acts as
a “blank check” to give the executive unlimited authority.168 Although the
amendment ultimately died in the senate, many lawmakers agreed that it was time to
have a vote on a new authorization.169 It is possible that in the future the 9/11 AUMF
will successfully be repealed, which would effectively end any explicit or implicit
authorization.170
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CONCLUSION
The Constitution generally requires that the President receive authorization from
Congress before conducting hostilities against an opposing force. Because Congress
has not passed an ISIL specific AUMF or declared war on ISIL, the authorization
must come from a different source. The campaign against ISIL is not unconstitutional
because Congress has authorized action in two different ways. First, the executive
has explicit authorization because ISIL is an associated force of al-Qaeda and
therefore falls under the 9/11 AUMF that was passed by Congress in 2001. Second,
the executive has implicit authorization because Congress continuously provides
funding to the executive for the purpose of conducting hostilities against ISIL, which
constitutes an authorization though means of appropriation.
The future of U.S. foreign policy has been somewhat unpredictable since the
election of Donald Trump as President. Due to the uncertainty of how Trump will
proceed during his presidency, it is hard to estimate how he will continue to combat
ISIL, which legal theory he will use to justify his actions, or who the U.S.’s key allies
will be in the campaign. Perhaps the only certain future aspect of U.S. foreign policy
is that the elimination of ISIL’s influence will remain a critical goal of both the
United States and its allies.
The constitutionality of the campaign against ISIL is a question that has become
increasingly important as most of the U.S. Government refuses to make any type of
meaningful decision. In addition to congressional gridlock, the judicial branch has
also refrained from providing guidance on the legality of the hostilities.171 A
standstill of these two branches seemingly creates an ultimatum of fighting an
unconstitutional war or halting the campaign against ISIL. The second option would
be detrimental to the United States and its allies because it would effectively halt the
efforts against ISIL, leaving the organization to continue expanding and conducting
devastating attacks. Fortunately, Congress has authorized, whether explicitly or
implicitly, U.S. military action against ISIL.

171. Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 304 (D.D.C. 2016) (dismissing the case under
the political question doctrine).

